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Criteria of International Tax Policy
by Herbert I. Lazeroww
A. Introduction
A generation ago, Professor (now Circuit Judge) Joseph Sneed identified seven pervasive
purposes of the income tax useful in evaluating proposals to change income tax provisions.   This paper1
asks whether those criteria apply also to the international aspects of the United States income tax, and
whether other criteria might also apply.  Sneed’s criteria are:
1. Adequacy.  To what extent does the provision raise adequate income?
2. Practicality. How easily administered by both the government and taxpayers is the provision? 
This criterion calls for provisions with bright lines, that respect normal business and accounting practices,
and that are easy and inexpensive to enforce.
3. Equality.  To what extent does the provision impose equal taxes on those with equal incomes?
4. Stability.  To what extent does the provision contribute to economic stability?
5. Reduced economic inequality.   To what extent does the provision reduce economic inequality
by disproportionately increasing tax as wealth increases?
1
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The close reader has noted that the statement of each criterion has assumed that no provision will2
perfectly implement that criterion, nor will any completely destroy it.  In each case, one is comparing the
proposed provision to the current one, and it is a matter of direction (e.g., does this provision increase or
reduce economic stability?) and degree (how much?).
I.R.C. §§ 861-865 (2004).3
Id. § 7701(b)(1)(A).4
Id. §§ 964(b);,, 988.5
Id. § 482.6
Compare id. § 351 (nonrecognition of gain or loss on transfer of property to a corporation if7
exchanged for a controlling share of its stock) with § 367  (recognizing such exchange if a United States
person transfers property to a foreign corporation).
I.R.C. § 999 (2004).  ; See also id. § 952(a)(4) (including illegal bribes and kickbacks as8
2
6. Free market compatibility.  To what extent does the provision distort what would happen in the
market in its absence?
7. Political order.  To what extent does the provision compliment or contradict the Cconstitution
or non-tax statutory provisions or implement the aspirations of a dominant political group?2
International income tax provisions can be divided into five groups. There are provisions defining
the territory, such as those specifying the geographic source of income,  or the definition of a resident.  3 4
Group two provisions are designed for uniquely international events, such as currency translation.  (and5
there may be arguments about whether groups one and two constitute but a single class). A third group of
provisions are ordinary, domestic tax provisions that happen to find their greatest field of application in
the international sphere.  An example is allocation of income.   The largest number of international tax6
provisions are overlays.  There is a perfectly good domestic provision that has problems in the
international area, so a new provision is enacted related to those international problems.  An example is
the area of tax-free incorporations, which under previous law permitted some gains to escape tax when
the property is transferred to a foreign corporation.   Finally, there are a series of provisions that use the7
tax laws to implement non-tax policies, such as international anti-boycott legislation.   Tax criteria do not8
2
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income).
A cynic would suggest that regardless of which party rules, there is no limit on the spending9
desires of the fFederal government.  But when Democrats are in charge, spending is restrained by the
state’s ability to collect taxes, while Republican spending is restrained by the government’s ability to
borrow.
Id. § 911.10
Id. § 861(h).  One might argue that this is not truly a loss of revenue because if this bank11
interest were taxed by the United StatesU.S., the gross amounts on deposit in U.S. banks would be
severely reduced with the result that the banks would have less taxable income and would pay much less
tax.  A careful empirical study might establish the truth of this proposition, but I find it dubious.
3
often influence the enactment of provisions in this fifth group, but they may be crucial in determining
their nature.
While Professor Sneed’s criteria are meant to be used on individual provisions, rather than on an
entire subsystem, and are meant to be analyzed in much more detail than is done below. , Iit is instructive
to take an impressionistic look at the extent to which his criteria seem appropriate to international
provisions.
B. The Sneed Criteria and International Tax
1. Adequacy
Adequacy on its face seems to assume that there is a set amount of income required by the federal
government.   For our purposes, it is easier to ask whether the provision tends to increase or decrease9
federal revenues.
Some international tax provisions decrease revenues.  One thinks of the foreign earned income
and housing exclusion, whereby the first $80,000 of earned income of a United States citizen with a bona
fide foreign residence is excluded from gross income  or the exclusion of certain bank interest from U.S.10
source income, thereby making it free of U.S. tax to foreign residents.11
3
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Elena L. Nguyen, The International Investment Position of the United States at Yearend 2001,12
82 SURVEY SURV. OF CURRENT BUSINESSBUS., July 2002, at 10 (July 2002); Russell Scholl, The
International Investment Position of the United States: Developments in 1971, 52 SURVEY SURV. OF
CURRENT BUSINESS BUS., Oct. 1972, at 18. #10 (October 19722002).
4
Tax treaties occupy a strange position.  The United States has signed more than 40 tax treaties. 
Most of them are with our major trading partners.  They reduce or eliminate tax at source on investment
income, grant the first right to tax to the source state on business income and personal service income but
only if that income is earned through a permanent establishment or a fixed base, and require the home
state to relieve double taxation by granting either a credit or a deduction for taxes paid in the source state. 
The practical effect (much simplified) is that the ability to tax interest and royalties is reserved to the
home state; tax on dividends is split roughly evenly between the source and the home state; and business
income is taxed almost entirely by the source state.  Through the late 1980s, the United States was a net
capital exporting state; since about 1990, it has been a net capital importer, though it remains a net
exporter for foreign direct investment (mostly stocks and bonds of controlled foreign corporations).  The
capital export is about 3/4 of the capital import.   So the net tax effect will depend on the kinds of income12
earned by those capital exports.
When the basic provisions of tax treaties became fixed, the United States was a net capital
exporter in all categories.  So its revenue benefitted from the way tax treaties exempted interest and
royalties from tax in the source country, and from tax treaties’ limit on source country taxation to half the
tax on dividends.  Provisions granting the source country’s unlimited right to tax income from real estate
simply confirmed the reality that the source country had the power to do so because it had control of the
realty, the income-generating entity.  The provisions on taxing business income and personal services
income carve a slice from the source country’s otherwise limitless tax jurisdiction: source country tax will
be imposed only when the activities in the source country reach a certain degree of intensity that is called
4
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I.R.C. § 351 (2004).13
Id. § §367.14
5
either a permanent establishment or a fixed base.  The practical obligation imposed on the home state by
tax treaties was to mitigate double taxation by providing either a credit for source country tax or a
deduction for source country income.  Most capital exporting states were already doing this as a matter of
domestic law, so although the promise was very valuable to capital-importing states because without it the
capital flow would be significantly reduced, these provisions had no net cost to the capital-exporting
states because they were already providing it.  Thus, when the income tax treaties’ provisions became
fixed for the United States, the provisions were revenue-enhancing.
Tax treaty status today depends on the precise figures, but it is fair to say that portfolio
investment (where the U.S. is more frequently the source state today) favors the home state, and foreign
direct investment (where the U.S. is more frequently the home state) appears to favor the source state, but
in fact favors the home state.  Consequently, as the United States shifts its position from home to source
state, treaty provisions that were once revenue-enhancing become revenue-draining.
Most international tax provisions tend to increase federal revenues.  The basic problem of
international tax is that a plethora of national jurisdictions impose widely varying taxes on different tax
bases and at different rates.  Given complete freedom, a rational taxpayer selects the tax system that
produces the lowest effective tax, whether by reducing the tax base, reducing the rate, or evasion.  Most
international tax provisions are designed to cabin that freedom.  For instance, a taxpayer can establish a
wholly-owned corporation and transfer assets to it without paying tax on the gain that has accrued on
those assets.   If these assets were located outside the United States or were intangible assets, they could13
be sold by a foreign taxpayer without realizing gain.  A special international tax provision requires that
the incorporator pay tax on some of these assets at the time of incorporation, thereby increasing federal
revenues.   Likewise a taxpayer’s attempt to allocate income to a low-tax jurisdiction or to allocate14
5
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Technically, this is achieved by classifying the sale of an asset by a nonresident as income from16
without the United States. Id. §§ 865(a)(2);,, 871(a)(1).
Id. § 881.17
6
deductions to the United States may be foiled by the Commissioner’s use of a provision requiring an
accounting system that clearly reflects the income of each taxpayer.15
2. Practicality
Practicality in domestic tax provisions usually refers to the clarity of the provision, the precision
of the lines it draws, the cost of practical enforcement, and the extent to which its dictates conform to the
way taxpayers would normally act.  With international tax, a new aspect of practicality is introduced.  The
tax must be collectible.  This is because the United States does not have continued jurisdiction over the
taxpayer, and may not have power over the asset when the tax that would otherwise be due remains
unpaid.
It is for this reason that capital gains on stock, bonds and other movable assets are not taxed by
the United States unless the owner is a United States person.   This is true even if the stock or debt is16
issued by a United States corporation.  The taxpayer is not subject to United States power, and the asset
that formed the connection to the United States no longer belongs to the taxpayer.
Another example: When a foreign corporation earns income in the United States, the foreign
corporation pays United States income tax on that income in the year in which it is earned.   To equalize17
the tax treatment of the foreign corporation with that of a U.S. corporation, the foreign corporation should
pay a further tax to the U.S. based on the extent to which the foreign corporation’s dividends consist of
income earned from U.S. businesses.
Enforcement of the first tax was easy; enforcement of the second tax was difficult.  The foreign
corporation was never publicly traded; though a foreign corporation, it was kept separate from other
businesses of the group to insulate related entities from litigation in the United States.S.  It was difficult
6




See Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 375 (describinges the requirements for an Advance Pricing20
Agreement); I.R.C. , while § 6662 (2004) (substantially increasinges the penalties for mistakes in §482
allocations).
7
for the I.R.S. to discover when the U.S. operation had paid dividends so that it could collect the second
tax.
Compare the branch profits tax.  This tax substitutes for the dividend tax.  It is triggered when
there are earnings that are repatriated from the U.S. operation.  This flow of capital from the U.S. to a
foreign location is easier to trace than the payment of a dividend abroad because it uses the banking
system, and matching it with a branch interest tax stymies the attempt to avoid it by making the original
capital contribution as a loan rather than a stock purchase.18
So it is fair to say that practicality is an important criterion of international tax.  Another example
of provisions that owe their shape to this kind of practicality include the limitations on outbound transfers
in corporate organizations and reorganizations.19
This is not to say that the world of international tax is devoid of complexity.  Many of the rules
are of a complexity that rivals the field of deferred compensation.  I once heard the Subpart F area
referred to as a simple rule overlain with DEELS–— Definitions, Exceptions, Exemptions, Limitations,
and Special rules.  But the areas of complexity are usually matched to taxpayers who can afford good tax
counsel, and are normally accompanied by safe harbor provisions guaranteeing taxpayers good results if
the safe harbor criteria are matched.
The largest area of significant unpredictability lies in income allocation involving intangibles. 
The rules channel the taxpayer toward a costly advanced pricing agreement, as there is no other way to




Published by Digital USD, 2005
France, Code Général des Impôts art. 83-3.21
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Equality poses a significant problems in all its applications.  Equality assumes that there is a
model to which the subject demanding equality should conform.  But no two taxpayers are ever identical,
so the question posed by equality is whether they are sufficiently similar to require equal treatment.  To
give a simple example, a person who believes that the important thing about income is its spendability is
likely to believe that an individual with $10,000 in income from wages should be taxed exactly the same
as a person who receives the same income, but all of it derived from the sale of stock.  There are two
ways in which the taxation may vary, the base and the rate.  Thus, a person who believesd that wage
income should be taxed less aggressively than capital gains income might argue that there are expenses of
earning wage income, such as commuting, clothes suitable for business, lunches that must be eaten in
restaurants, etc., that are not deductible and that do not figure in the cost of earning capital gains.  That
person might propose that: 1) these expenses be deductible; or 2) a forfeitary deduction should be
available in lieu of actual expenses, as France makes available to its employees;  or 3) the rate of tax21
imposed on wages should be lower.  By the same token, proponents of capital gains income will have
reasons why it should be accorded more preferential tax than wage income.
The argument in international tax circles is similar.  One group argues that all U.S. citizens and
residents should be taxed equally on the same income, regardless of its source.  This is called capital-
export neutrality (CEN).  It requires that the tax abroad always be the same or less than the home-state
tax, and requires the home state to completely relieve double taxation.  Another group argues that the
crucial question is whether everyone carrying on activities in the same place is treated equally.  For this
group, everyone doing business in the U.S. should suffer the same level of taxation, regardless of their
state of residency or citizenship.  This is called capital-import neutrality (CIN), and requires that tax be
imposed only at source.  This is sometimes called a tax based on territoriality, but this is deceptive, as its
message is that the home state must refrain from taxing.  We will meet both CEN and CIN again in their
8
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I.R.C. § 911 (2004).22
Id. §§ 951-964.23
While it can be argued that foreigners are also subject to special rules on the disposition of real24
estate that are not applicable to U.S. taxpayers, I do not believe that is true. The Foreign Investors Real
Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) serves to collect tax on the sale of U.S. realty when a U.S. person would pay
it.  Id. § 897.
Id. §§ 871(a), 881(a).25
9
most prevalent use, free market compatibility.
Here, however, the question is equality, where the standard discourse relates to fairness, not to
economic efficiency.  The comparisons to be made in the international field are two: between income
earned domestically and income earned abroad, and between income earned in the U.S. by home-state
taxpayers (citizens, residents, U.S. corporations), and by foreign taxpayers.
There are some significant differences in theat taxation of income earned abroad from that of
income earned in the U.S.   The exemption of the first $80,000 of earned income from abroad is one.  22
The fact that income earned abroad through a closed corporation is not taxed by the United States.S. until
it is repatriated is another.  However, it should be noted that for a generation, some income earned abroad
by controlled foreign corporations is subject to current tax.   Much of this discussion is carried on in23
economic terms but much is also couched in terms of equity.
Turning to foreign taxpayers, the basic rule for foreign taxpayers who receive business income
from the United States is the same as for U.S. taxpayers, except for the branch profits tax.  Foreign
taxpayers receiving investment income are subject to substantially different tax treatment.   While24
domestic taxpayers are taxed on their net investment income at ordinary graduated rates, foreign
taxpayers are taxed on their gross income at a flat 30% rate.   The 30% rate has remained unchanged25
through successive rounds of tax cuts, so whatever its relationship might have been to the rates in force
when enacted, that relationship has changed significantly over the years.
9
Lazerow:
Published by Digital USD, 2005
Politicians seldom find the economy overheated, and frequently declare it under-developed. 26
Constituents with jobs are thought unlikely to vote out the incumbent.
10
In taxing foreign investment income differently, the justification has been practicality.  Because
the taxpayer is not subject to U.S. taxing jurisdiction as the home state, these different rules are justified
as ways to ensure that the tax is collected.  There is no requirement in tax law, as there is in certain
constitutional law cases, that the least restrictive means be chosen.
4. Stability
Stability is a strange criterion. It refers to the tendency of a tax provision to correct an economy
out of equilibrium.  If the economy is overheating, a provision that conforms to stability will restrain it.  If
the economy is insufficiently developed, a provision that conforms to stability will re result in increased
investment.   It assumes the correctness of the Keynesian multiplier-accelerator interaction, and that26
government investment has less stimulating effect on the economy than private investment.
The classic illustration of a provision that provides stability is the progressive rate structure.  As
incomes grow (inflation), it takes more and more money from the private sector and, as incomes shrink,
the tax take shrinks more than proportionally.
It does not appear that this criterion has much bite in international tax.  No provisions come to
mind that are characterized by their anti-cyclical effects.  Indeed, to the extent that the international
sphere is dominated by corporations, where tax rates are only progressive at very low levels, stabilizing
provisions are not frequently encountered.
5. Reduced Economic Inequality
Reduced economic inequality is another criterion that is not frequently discussed in international
tax circles.  In domestic tax circles, it tends to appear with provisions that grant benefits whose recipients
turn out to be mostly low income taxpayers.  An example is the exclusion for meals and lodging provided
10
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Id. § 119.27
Id. §§ 21 (dependent care credit),; id. § 31 (earned income credit);, id. § 68 (itemized28
deductions);, id. § 151(d) (personal exemptions).
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in kind on the employer’s premises,  the largest number of whose beneficiaries are maids and restaurant27
workers.  A second class of economic inequality reducers are provisions that grant benefits that disappear
as income increases, such as the dependent care credit, earned income credit, personal exemption or
itemized deductions.28
On this matter, it is hard to think of a single provision that is exclusively international that
satisfies this criterion.  Indeed, if anything international can be said on this topic, it is that the failure to
tax investment income of foreign residents at progressive rates, and the failure to consider their other
(non-U.S. source income) in setting those rates, contravenes reduced economic inequality.  But given the
sharp decline in progressivity in U.S. tax rates, since 1986 this criterion has appeared less important than
it was when professor Sneed wrote.
Nor is it clear that the United States cares much about the distribution of assets outside the U.S. 
So it can be argued that whatever the position of reduced economic inequality for considering the taxation
of American citizens or residents, it has no place in the taxation of foreigners.
6. Free Market Compatibility
Free market compatibility asks that taxes be designed so that they distort as little as possible the
investment and spending decisions that would otherwise be made.  Put another way, this is a criterion of
economic efficiency.  The assumption is that persons make investment and spending decisions based on
the best economic return after taxes. The economy benefits when those decisions are made based on
greatest expected return.  Likewise, the greatest satisfaction of societal wants occurs in a situation of
perfect competition, because prices are competed down to where they only slightly exceed cost.  This
makes the greatest number of goods and services available for a minimal cost.  If this economic situation
11
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can be achieved or approached, the function of the tax system is to not destroy it.  Decisions should still
be made based on economic return, not based on tax considerations.
Any tax will disturb pure economic calculations, but some will disturb them more than others. 
For example, a tax imposed at the same rate will disturb economic decisions less than a tax that has
different rates for substitutable products.  A tax imposed on a large set of similar transactions (like the
income tax) is preferable to a tax imposed on a smaller set of transactions (such as an oil extraction tax). 
A tax imposed at a uniform rate on all investment opportunities would alter investor decisions less than a
tax that exempted interest from bonds of state or local governments, or that taxed long term capital gains
at a lower rate than periodic income from the same investment.  If the tax is to be less general, it is better
to impose it on transactions for which there are no readily-available substitutes.  This goes not to the
equity of the tax.  The tax may be quite inequitable, but still meet the criterion of free market
compatibility because the taxpayer has difficulty avoiding it by substituting a comparable non-taxable
transaction.
It is in the criterion of free market compatibility that the battle between capital-export neutrality
(CEN) and capital-import neutrality (CIN) reaches its climax.
CEN starts with the proposition that most international tax questions revolve around investment. 
It postulates that the key decision-maker is the investor.  The tax system should not distort the investor’s
decisions.  The investor has a choice among many investments, including some that are domestic and
some that are located abroad.  A tax system that does not distinguish between those investments is CEN
because the investor will not consider taxes in deciding whether the invest at home or abroad.
The largest violation of CEN in the U.S. tax system is according deferral to income earned
through a foreign corporation.  That income is not taxed until repatriated.  All other things being equal,
that deferral gives the investor in foreign assets through a foreign corporation a big advantage over the
investor in a domestic corporation, which would pay U.S. tax annually on its income.  With a foreign
12
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Other benefits of deferral, such as likely monetary inflation making the cost of taxes paid later29
worth less in real terms, the likelihood that rates will change to the advantage of the taxpayer, and the




corporation, the income can be accumulated and reinvested abroad without being diminished by U.S.
taxes.   While the above assumes that income taxes imposed by foreign countries do not offset the29
deferred U.S. income tax, that is frequent enough with investment income to be realistic.
Consequently, a great step toward free market compatibility was taken with the partial enactment
of the Kennedy proposals as Subpart F,  which ended deferral for many kinds of passive and related-30
party income earned abroad.  While this did not eliminate the difference between working through
domestic and foreign corporations, it reduced that difference.
The CEN principle of neutrality also applies to labor-export neutrality.  A person, in deciding
whether to work at home or abroad, should not be influenced by tax considerations.  The earned income
exclusion that permits the exclusion from U.S. gross income of the first $80,000 of earned income from
abroad, is the principal offender.31
Partisans of CIN take a different view.  For them, the important thing is to create a perfectly
competitive experience.  For them, source is all.  Persons from many countries will do business in country
X.  The important competitive equality requires that all persons doing business in country X be subject to
the same taxes; otherwise, one will be at a competitive advantage.  The inevitable implication of CIN is
that only the source country can tax that enterprise.  Or, another possibility is that the tax on the enterprise
cannot exceed the tax imposed by the source country which could, by tax treaty, cede some of its normal
taxing jurisdiction to the host country.  In that case, there must also be a limit on the tax jurisdiction of the
host country so that the total tax imposed would not exceed the tax imposed by the source country on
competing enterprises that do not benefit from tax treaties: domestic enterprises, and enterprises of other
13
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Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001).
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countries with whom the source country does not have a tax treaty.
Both deferral for investments through foreign corporations and the earned income exclusion go in
the direction of implementing CIN, but not entirely.  While there are many European countries who
exempt the foreign business income of their enterprises, which is a CIN move, they almost universally
count that exempted income in determining the progressive rates to be applied, which is decidedly non-
CIN.32
7. Political Order
It is not clear that political order has much purchase in the realm of international tax.  There do
not seem to be great constitutional principles at stake, though the role of federalism seems to be quite
strong in the U.S. refusal to limit by treaty the taxing power of any of its states other than by a
nondiscrimination clause.
Likewise, it does not appear that the political parties have sharply differentiated views on
international tax questions.  While Republican rhetoric has perhaps been more business-friendly, there
have been no shortage of Democratic votes for export subsidies, and Republican administrations seem as
determined as their Democratic counterparts to stamp out international tax evasion.
C. Other criteria
1. Job Creation or Preservation
One constantly hears arguments that lead to the creation or preservation of U.S. jobs.
For instance, a persistent part of U.S. international tax policy has been a subsidy for exports.  The
names change with the seasons and as the WTO declares the provisions in violation of free trade
agreements, but the purpose remains constant: to relieve exporters of some of their tax burden.  Other
countries subsidize exports by relieving them of the value added tax.  Lacking a national sales or value
14
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added tax, the U.S. solution has been to provide income tax relief.  The appeal here is to the jobs created
by exports.
Other examples are provisions designed to lure foreign capital to the United States.  Exemption
from income tax of interest deposited in U.S. banks  increases the amount of capital available for loan to33
U.S. businesses, which in turn permits the creation of more U.S. jobs.
There has even been talk of removing tax benefits from U.S. corporations who choose to become
foreign corporations.
While these discussions and consequences are real, I prefer to think of them as part of a larger
criterion of Balance-of-Payments Enhancement.
2. Balance-of-Payments Enhancement
The balance of payments is a huge accounting game.  If the U.S. buys more goods abroad than it
sells abroad, it has a trade deficit.  It is a net dollar debtor.  Without further activity, the U.S. will need to
give foreign countries gold in order to redeem the dollars the U.S. has used to buy goods.
Fortunately, trade is not the only activity that causes money to cross national boundaries.  There
is also the supply of services, tourism, returns on investment such as dividends, interest and royalties, and
investments themselves.
No country can run a long-term balance of payments deficit.  No one has enough gold to do that. 
If it appears that there will be a long-term deficit in its balance of payments, the market will devalue the
currency of the deficit-running country.  This will make its imports more expensive, and also make it
more expensive for its residents to invest abroad.  Devaluation makes the country’s exports cheaper, and
renders investment in the country less costly for foreigners in terms of their currency.  So in the long run,
the system is self-correcting, and deficits in the balance of payments will disappear.  But in the
meanwhile, there may be significant dislocations, which the U.S. wishes to avoid by keeping exports high
15
Lazerow:
Published by Digital USD, 2005
Id. §§ 865(a)(2),;, 871(a)(1).34
Id. § 897.35
See, e.g., United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir 2003), cert. denied, ____ U.S.36
_____, 124 S. Ct. 1410 (2004) ; United States v. Arthur Andersen, 2003-2 UST.C. ¶ 50,624 (N. D. IL Ill.
2003).
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and maintaining a high level of incoming investment.
Examples in the tax system are many.  In addition to the export subsidies and exemption of
income from U.S. bank accounts just mentioned, there is no tax on U.S. capital gains,  and most of our34
tax treaties eliminate tax on interest and royalties, and reduce them on dividends flowing abroad.  The
most prominent exception is the tax on gains by foreigners on U.S. real estate,  thereby reducing its35
attraction to a foreign investor.
D. Summary and Ordering
We have seen that the criteria of Reduced Economic Inequality, Stability and Political Order have
little purchase in discussions of international tax policy.  Adequacy, Practicality, Equity, Free Market
Compatibility and Balance-of-payments Enhancement seem important international criteria.
It would enhance the utility of the concept if one could rank the importance of these five criteria. 
While I am unable to assign constant rankings to the criteria, some obseervations about them can be
assayed.
Practicality in the sense of power is an important negative criterion.  Tax provisions that wish to
reach beyond U.S. territorial grasp seldom see the light of day.  On the other hand, the enforcement of
subpoenas on sellers of U.S. tax shelters, and the controversy over whether they must disclose the identity
of their clients (even where the subject matter lies abroad) indicate that actual practicality may be broader
than cynics believe.36
Practicality in the sense of ease of application is not a very important international criterion. 
Most taxpayers with international tax problems are sophisticated, wealthy and well-represented.  In the
16
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The universality of transient occupancy taxes on hotel rooms is good evidence of that.  The37
finance minister to Louis XIV’s finance minister, Jean Baptiste Colbert, put it this way: “The art of
taxation consistslies in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest  amountnumber of feathers with the
smallest amount of squealalking.”
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absence of enhanced sanctions, they would sacrifice predictability for a chance at the slightest benefit.
Free Market Compatibility and Balance-of-payments Enhancement are two other criteria much in
play.  There are few international provisions that do not invoke both of these considerations.
Adequacy should be a criterion much in play, as extracting taxes from people who cannot vote
(aliens) or people who do not regularly vote (nonresident citizens) is a basic tenet of politics.   Yet one37
seldom sees international provisions as major revenue enhancers or revenue losers.
Equity is an argument frequently made, though it does not appear to have significant weight
outside the area of Free Market Compatibility.
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